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The objective of this paper is to review the obstacles to cross-border integration and 
consolidation, which confront banks operating within the EU. Theoretical and 
empirical evidence supports the view that integration and consolidation in the banking 
sector can enhance overall economic performance via macroeconomic stabilisation, 
higher levels of efficiency and consumer welfare. While in recent years only slow 
progress has been recorded in EU cross-border banking integration, a substantial 
consolidation in the Member State’s national banking sectors has occurred leading to 
rising domestic concentration ratios implying greater efficiency but potentially 
limiting welfare gains. The lack of progress in cross-border integration can be 
attributed to various factors, including national differences in market practices, 
regulation and taxation. A fairly comprehensive list of existing obstacles is provided 
and their impact on the main avenues for cross-border banking integration is 
examined, namely on (i) organic growth in the form of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries, (ii) cross-border mergers and acquisitions and (iii) cross-border provision 
of banking services. In addition, the role of institutional factors relating to the 
framework for prudential supervision is considered, notably in the context of the 
relationship of home and host country supervisors with each other and with market 
participants. While the highlighted issues are of general relevance in the context of 
EU financial integration, they might be of special significance in the context of the 
recently acceded Member States and their largely foreign owned banking system. 
                                                 
1 A number of colleagues have commented on various drafts of this paper. John Berrigan provided a 
number of suggestions for its structure, in addition to making valuable comments on the text. The paper 
benefited from comments by Delphine Sallard and Patrick Pearson on supervisory issues, by Christine 
Gerstberger on the banking structure of new EU Member States, and by Jan Host Schmidt, Jürgen 
Kröger, Massimo Suardi, Roderick Meiklejohn, Gaetan Nicodeme, Arnaud Pecker, Michael Thom and 
Arto Leppilahti on a number of other issues. Ken Lennan provided suggestions for Section 4 and 
comments were also made by Magnus Astberg. The help of Daniel Vandewalle and Ramiro Gomez 
Villalba in relation to data on mergers and acquisitions is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining 
errors are solely the fault of the authors. Views expressed represent exclusively the positions of the 
authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission. 
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1. Introduction 
In the eyes of a parent, a child does not grow older. Often, an outsider is required to 
point out that the child has already become a young adult. In several respects, the 
same can be said of the EU financial sector. For those closely involved in the process 
of EU financial integration, progress always appears slow and incomplete even if the 
reality may be different. For example, a “reality-check” against a brave vision put 
forward by The Economist magazine in 1989 confirms the extent to which the EU 
financial landscape has indeed changed over the years. The vision was summarised as 
follows:  
  “Cast your mind forward a few years and European finance could look 
something like this. The share prices of Fiat, Peugeot and Volkswagen flash up 
side by side on dealing screens from the Republic of Ireland to Athens. 
Computers click: the deal is done, and ownership is shifted instantaneously 
from a Belgian seller to a Spanish buyer. Italian investors pour into Dutch 
mutual funds, while Daimler Benz chooses Crédit Lyonnais to lead-manage its 
latest D-mark bond issue. Germans take out British life insurance, Danes take 
out German mortgages, Spaniards open bank accounts in Italy. Aunt Agatha 
and Tante Emma are as happy as lambs buying here an ecu interest-rate future, 
there a tempting bond with an equity warrant.”
2 
Fifteen years on, the vision is far from fulfilled but the extent of progress in EU 
financial integration is undeniable. With the introduction of the euro, pan-EU trading 
in securities is no longer a far-fetched idea and there are few EU financial sectors 
more integrated than investment banking. On the other hand, cross-border provision 
of retail financial products and services, such as mortgages and deposit accounts, is a 
less common feature – suggesting the persistence of significant gaps in the integration 
process. This paper examines one such gap - the absence of cross-border integration 
in the EU banking sector and the persistence of segmented national markets for retail 
banking services, increasingly dominated by large players. 
A long-anticipated surge in the establishment of branches and subsidiaries across 
borders, international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and cross-border provision of 
banking services in the EU has failed to materialise. This failure is striking in view of 
several apparently catalytic developments – notably the liberalisation of capital 
movements and efforts to create an internal market in financial services.
3 Expectations 
of cross-border integration in EU retail banking were especially high in advance of 
the introduction of the euro, with many commentators predicting a sharp re-
orientation towards a pan-EU retail banking sector in the absence of exchange-rate 
risk. However, cross-border integration have not been major features of developments 
in EU retail banking in recent years and this latest disappointment suggests that 
                                                 
2 The Economist (1989). 
3 The liberalisation of capital movements encompasses also the right (i) of establishment, (ii) of cross-
border direct investment and (iii) of a takeover of foreign companies. See Raes (2003).  
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obstacles – other than exchange-rate risk - have yet to be addressed. Even the 
implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
4 - another potential 
catalyst to cross-border integration in retail banking – may disappoint in this regard. 
While the necessary degree of regulatory convergence may well be achieved via the 
FSAP, other fundamental obstacles such as national differences in tax regimes, the 
practical inability to enforce cross-border collateral pledges and differences in 
consumer protection requirements are likely to hinder efforts to integrate retail 
banking at the EU level. In addition, the supervisory framework could be improved to 
alleviate concerns in the context of the relationship of home and host country 
supervisors with each other and with market participants.  
While the meaning of “integration” may be intuitively obvious, no universally agreed 
definition exists.
5 This paper avoids entering the debate on an exact definition but 
focuses on possible avenues to be taken for achieving integration, namely (i) organic 
growth in the form of foreign branches and subsidiaries, (ii) cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and (iii) the offering of services on a cross-border basis and the extent to 
which such avenues may not be available within the EU retail banking sector.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the 
theoretical and empirical support (i) for banking integration in terms of enhanced 
competition and macroeconomic stability, and (ii) for banking consolidation in terms 
of enhancing the banking-sector’s contribution to economic performance. Section 3 
considers a range of factors, which facilitate banking integration and cross-border 
consolidation and assesses the current level of integration and consolidation in the EU 
banking sector, both within and across national borders. This is followed by an 
excursus examining the trends toward concentration in domestic retail banking and 
possible implications for consumer welfare in the absence of a further round of cross-
border consolidation. Section 4 looks at the different avenues – and their specific 
problems - of banking integration inherent in (i) the single license, (ii) cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions and (iii) the cross-border provision of services. Section 5 
focuses on the current EU supervisory framework. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Economic significance of banking sector consolidation 
 
2.1. The economic role of banks as financial intermediaries 
 
As financial intermediaries, banks play an essential role in the economy by, inter alia, 
transforming assets, facilitating risk management, financing trade, enabling capital 
accumulation, and spurring technological innovation. More fundamentally, banks can 
be said to contribute to economic performance via two important functions which 
contribute to efficient resource allocation:  
                                                 
4  After adoption of the relevant EU legislation for the FSAP almost completed, it is now mostly up to 
Member States to implement the relevant provisions nationally.   
5 For an example of authors offering different definitions see Dermine (2002) and Baele et al. (2004) 
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•  A monitoring function for investors: The financial system is characterised by an 
information asymmetry between those wishing to borrow at the lowest possible 
cost and those wishing to invest at the highest possible return. This asymmetry 
creates risk for the investor, as the borrower cannot be relied upon to be entirely 
transparent about his creditworthiness. Verification of the creditworthiness of each 
potential borrower is costly and, while it may be feasible for larger-scale investors 
to undertake their own credit-analysis, the smaller investor typically lacks the 
required resources. It is in these conditions that a bank fulfils the role of 
monitoring credit quality on behalf of individual investors and so ensuring the 
highest possible level of investment.  
•  A gatekeeper function for companies: In the absence of a monitoring intermediary, 
investors would tend to apply an average value to all possible investment 
opportunities. This would imply over-investment in lower quality projects and 
under-investment in higher quality projects. Through their capacity to rank 
investment opportunities in order of quality, banks ensure that savings are 
channelled to those projects with the highest (risk-adjusted) rate of return, thereby 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.  
These important functions would suggest a positive correlation between banking-
sector development and economic performance, although causality could operate in 
either direction. While theoretical and empirical work in the field of financial 
development and economic performance is relatively new, evidence would seem to 
confirm the importance of a developed - hence efficient – banking sector in boosting 
economic performance.  
Using a macro-approach, King and Levine (1993) find a positive correlation between 
a developed banking sector, productivity growth and output per capita in studies of 
(i)  80 countries over the period 1960-1989; (ii) the experience of financial sector 
reforms in five countries; (iii) firm-level evidence on the allocative effects of financial 
reforms; and (iv) the success of general policy reforms depending on financial 
development. Levine et al. (2000) demonstrate a strong positive link between 
financial intermediary development and economic growth, using a range of indicators 
of intermediation such as overall size of intermediaries and the extent to which 
financial institutions funnel credit to private sector activities. The authors apply a 
variety of econometric techniques to a panel dataset of 74 countries covering the 
period from 1960 to 1995. The possibility of reverse causality is rejected. They 
further demonstrate that development of financial intermediation is fostered by (i) 
laws that give a high priority to secured creditors receiving the full present value of 
their claims against defaulted firms; (ii) legal systems that rigorously enforce 
contracts; and (iii) high quality accounting standards, which deliver comprehensive 
and comparable corporate financial statements.
6 Similarly, Beck et al. (2000) find a 
robust and positive link between financial intermediary development and total factor 
productivity growth which feeds through to overall GDP growth. 
Other empirical analysis using a macro approach broadens the concept of financial 
development to give financial markets a more prominent role next to intermediaries. 
                                                 
6 While Leahy et al. (2001) find financial development related to economic growth, they judge the 
direction of the causation in these relationships to be unclear.  
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In a broad overview article, Levine (1997) documents a strong positive link between 
the functioning and development of the financial system as a whole and long-run 
economic growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) complement their measure of banking 
sector development (using the value of loans made by commercial banks and other 
deposit-taking banks to the private sector corrected for GDP) with a proxy for the 
development of the stock market. The authors show that banking/financial-market 
development is positively and robustly correlated with current and future economic 
growth, as capital accumulation and productivity increases. Beck and Levine (2004) 
find that both banks and stock markets independently boost growth.
7 
 
In terms of micro-level analysis, Rajan and Zingales (1998) focus on the theoretical 
channels through which financial development might affect economic growth by 
looking at more disaggregated data. This approach is also an attempt to refute 
suggestions that correlations between economic growth and financial development are 
related to another, unobserved variable. The authors begin from the hypothesis that 
industries, which are more dependent on external financing (as opposed to financing 
from retained profits), will have relatively higher growth rates in countries that have 
more developed financial markets. Utilising a proxy for financial dependence on a 
sample of publicly listed companies, the authors find that financial development 
influences economic growth rates via the reduction of the cost of external finance to 
financially dependent firms. In that context, the paper suggests that a developed 
financial system may play a crucial role in the rise of new firms, while a lack of 
financial development may favour incumbent firms - able to fund themselves through 
retained profits - over new entrants. 
 




Foreign bank entry forces domestic banks to compete and improve their services. 
Claessens et al. (2001), using 7900 observations from 80 countries for the 1988-1995 
period, observe that for most countries a larger foreign ownership share of banks is 
correlated with a reduction in profitability and margins of domestically owned banks. 
Another finding of the paper is that foreign bank entry matters more in terms of 
numbers of foreign bank entries, rather than in terms of foreign bank market share 
suggesting that the impact of foreign competition is felt immediately upon foreign 
bank entry, with domestically owned banks reacting within a very short period of 
time. Overall, foreign bank entry seems to enhance client welfare. The result is 
supported by Levine (2003) who finds in a study of almost 1200 banks in 47 countries 
that restricting foreign bank entry boosts bank net interest margins.  
 
Lensink and Hermes (2004) note that foreign banks  entering  a  domestic  market        
(i) increase competition, thus lowering the costs for clients and enhance service 
quality, and (ii) bring with them innovative financial services and practices, which 
forces the domestically owned banking community to adapt and equally engage in 
                                                 
7 However, Andrés et al. (1999) do not find a significant growth-financial relationship for developed 
countries. For a broad overview confirming that financial development is related to economic growth 
even in industrial countries see Thiel (2001). 
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innovation, a costly process in the short term. In developing countries, due to the 
often considerable gap, in terms of financial development, between foreign and 
domestically owned banks, the latter factor – the so-called spill-over effect - is more 
significant than the competition effect. In contrast, the spill-over effect pales besides 
the competition effect in more developed countries and foreign bank entry leads here 
to overall lower margins, profits and costs.  
 
Foreign bank entry seems therefore to improve overall welfare, as long as the reduced 
profitability of domestically owned banks does not make them more vulnerable to 
distress. This might be especially dangerous in an environment of weak prudential 
regulations and supervisory structures (Claessens et al., 2001).  
 
EU banking integration might imply for the recently acceded EU Member States 
heightened competitive pressure on their banking system, as the comparatively high 
margins may erode over time. In case this would not be accompanied with cost 







In economies where banks do not cross borders, the fate of an economy and its banks 
are closely tied as an economic downturn would affect the profitability and stability of 
the country’s banking sector, thereby deepening recessions due (i) to non-financial 
companies’ collateral loss and (ii) banks’ capital losses. However, foreign bank entry 
can have consequences for macroeconomic stability in several respects as foreign 
bank subsidiaries (or branches) behave not as completely autonomous businesses, but 
instead as part of a larger bank holding company.  
 
A positive effect on macroeconomic stabilisation can arise as a bank operating in two 
different countries can import capital to the country where lending opportunities are 
good, despite eventual bank capital losses in that region, thus protecting national 
economies against bank specific shocks. In that sense, geographic bank diversification 
smoothens the respective overall bank holdings’ business volatility and thus stabilises 
borrowing conditions for the respective bank clients. In contrast, another possibility 
might be that banks cease lending in an environment of economic decline and export 
their capital to other, more promising, economies, thus aggravating a local economic 
downturn. Many caution that the latter possibility could become especially relevant in 
case of financial fragility at the home bank, when a distressed bank holding company 
re-patriates capital causing lending restrictions for foreign subsidiaries. Another worry 
is related to the case of cross-border lending which is said to be very volatile. On a 
theoretical level, therefore, foreign bank entry could be either stabilising or de-
stabilising for an economy. To obtain greater clarity regarding the net effect in 
macrostabilisation, a number of authors have turned to empirical investigations.  
 
Most empirical papers find a net positive macroeconomic stabilisation effect of 
foreign bank lending. Following the deregulation of the US banking sector in recent 
years, where states have opened their borders to non-state banks, Morgan et al. (2003) 
                                                 
8 See also European Central Bank (2005), p. 28 
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finds reduced business volatility as integration allowed banks to diversify against 
shocks to their own capital. The authors find a de-linking of bank capital growth and 
employment growth within states, as state banks became increasingly interlinked with 
non-state banks. In addition, falling state-specific variation in employment and 
personal income growth is demonstrated, even when taking into account different 
growth rates or aggregated business cycles. Overall the benefits of bank integration 
are most pronounced in the least diversified states. The smaller and more correlated 
state business cycles lead the authors to speculate that banking integration might be 
one factor behind the recently observed decline in aggregate US economic volatility. 
Similarly, Hughes et al. (1999) demonstrate that US interstate consolidation improved 
bank efficiency, particularly when the objective of the consolidation was to diversify 
macroeconomic risk and so to reduce insolvency risk. Although those papers are 
mainly drawing on US experiences, the conclusion seems to be that banking 
integration results in reduced business volatility and enhanced overall macroeconomic 
stability due to geographical risk spreading. These understandings combined with the 
often observed large differences in economic cycles across the Member States in the 
EU, lead to the conclusion that banking integration might have a similar beneficial 
effect in Europe as well. 
 
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2003) study whether foreign owned banks have reacted 
differently than domestically owned banks to prevalent business cycle conditions and 
host country banking crisis. For this, the authors look at the effects of foreign bank 
entry into Central and Eastern Europe. Their dataset panel comprises data on more 
than 300 banks for the period 1993-2000 with detailed bank ownership information. 
The authors demonstrate that during crisis periods domestic banks contracted their 
credit and deposit bases, whereas foreign banks did not. Additional evidence for this 
thesis comes from Peek and Rosengreen (2000), Crystal et al. (2002) and Goldberg et 
al. (2000). All three papers – focusing on developments in an emerging market 
context in Latin America - agree that foreign owned banks were better able to absorb 
losses when compared with domestically owned banks and have thereby strengthened 
the financial systems of their host countries.  
 
Another finding of De Haas and Van Lelyveld is that deteriorating home-country 
conditions lead foreign holding companies to encourage their foreign subsidiaries to 
increase their lending activities in order to compensate for the lack of profitable 
investment conditions for their mother banks in the home country. This is taken by the 
authors as an indication that the parent bank allocates scarce capital among its 
subsidiaries on the basis of expectations of national risk/return characteristics.  
 
While Peek and Rosengreen (2000), Montgomery (2003) and Clarke et al. (2001) 
stress the overall stabilisation effects of the presence of foreign banks, the authors find 
in an emerging market context that the stability of foreign bank lending varies by 
method of entry with foreign cross-border lending most volatile. In contrast, as 
suggested by Montgomery, branch lending is more stable and foreign subsidiaries’ 
credit seems to be the most reliable. However, the latter two papers cite limited 
empirical evidence on this matter and call for further research. An interesting 
perspective on the issue is offered by Martinez Peria et al. (2002) who seem to 
suggest that cross-border lending might represent the first phase of a bank’s foreign 
expansion. The authors find more stable lending behaviour as branch and subsidiary 
lending becomes more important over time. However, the apparently more volatile 
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In contrast, a destabilising effect of foreign banks is shown by Peek and Rosengren 
(1997a) who find that – following the Japanese stock-market decline - binding risk-
based capital requirements resulted in a decreased lending by Japanese banks in the 
United States. While Martinez Peria et al. (2002) confirm that banks transmit shocks 
from their home countries, an increasing overall exposure of a foreign bank to a host 
country leads to a decreasing shock transmission effect. Goldberg (2001) finds that 
US foreign bank claims are highly correlated with US GDP growth, but not with 
foreign demand conditions of other industrial countries and of emerging Asia. 
However, lending to Latin America expands in line with US GDP growth.  
 
Although foreign banks’ ability to follow different lending cycles than domestically 
owned banks seem to result in much needed stabilisation effects during crisis time, 
there is also evidence of destabilising effects, which would suggest a role for efficient 
and properly designed supervisory and regulatory structures. Overall, though, the 
presence of foreign banks seems to exert a stabilising effect on the domestic economy. 
This seems to be confirmed by the recently acceded Member States’ experience, 
where the relatively strong links between their banking systems and those of the 




2.3. Consolidation and banking sector performance 
A significant consequence of EU banking integration will be consolidation – both 
domestic and cross-border – reflecting structural adjustments to a more competitive 
environment and the availability of increased scale and scope economies.
11 The 
following examines therefore the relevant effects of consolidation on client welfare, 
operating efficiency, profit efficiency and overall efficiency.  
 
Client welfare 
The impact of consolidation on banking-sector performance remains controversial.
12 
However, a number of empirical papers indicate that banking consolidation – if 
successful - increases client welfare by improving lending rates and credit access for 
borrowers, as well as raising deposit rates but over longer time periods.
13 For 
example, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2002) show that bank consolidation 
                                                 
9 Caution might be recommendable before applying those results too literally in an EU context, which 
is so fundamentally dissimilar in institutional, economical and political terms when compared with off-
shore lending to emerging markets.  
10 On this see Section 3.2 of this paper and European Central Bank (2005).  
11 Integration and cross-border consolidation are expected to coincide, although – theoretically – it 
would be possible to observe the one without the other. 
12 For example Schenk (2000) declares most banking mergers to be economic failures. 
13 Banking fees are not a focus of the analysis for most papers.  
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improves the availability of credit for (high-quality) corporate borrowers. Using a set 
of Italian banks with a high number of small and privately held companies as clients, 
Sapienza (2002) discovers that in-market mergers (involving banks operating 
previously in the same geographical area) benefit borrowers if such mergers involve 
the acquisition of banks with small market shares, as rates charged by the 
consolidated bank decline. However, this effect is reversed if the merged banks 
increase their combined market share significantly, possibly due to competition 
problems. The positive interest rate effect is equally found in out-of market mergers 
(involving banks previously operating in another geographical area), but to a lesser 
extent.   
In contrast, some analyses, e.g. the just cited Sapienza (2002), indicate that smaller 
borrowers are disadvantaged by bank consolidation to the extent that long-standing 
bank-client relationships and lending policies are disrupted, and the transfer of 
information from the target institution to the acquiring bank is not smooth. Moreover, 
evidence suggests that the problems for small borrowers increase with the size of the 
acquiring bank, with larger acquiring banks tending to cut off many more small 
borrowers. In an emerging market context, Berger et al. (2001) find large size and 
foreign ownership of banks as being statistically significant barriers for providing 
relationship lending services in Argentina. The effect seems to be most pronounced 
for small businesses with delinquencies in repaying loans. In surveying a sample of 
small US firms in the mid-1990s, Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) find that banking 
consolidation has no significant effect on small firms’ ability to obtain loans. 
However, they seem to increase non-price loan costs (e.g. service fees) as well as 
leading to a deterioration in   service quality and an increase in the frequency of small 
companies changing banks.  
Peek and Rosengren (1997b) argue that bank consolidation need not always curtail 
small business lending. The authors state that an acquiring bank tends to recast the 
target bank in its own image, which leads the new consolidated bank to have a similar 
portfolio composition of small business clients to that of the acquiring bank. In this 
respect, bank consolidation would be problematic for smaller enterprises if the 
acquiring bank was not already a significant lender to such enterprises. However, the 
authors point out that in roughly half of the commercial and savings bank mergers in 
the United States, the acquirer had a larger small business loan portfolio than the 
target bank. In addition, the most common acquirer of a small bank had been another 
small bank. Consequently, bank consolidation may actually promote small-business 
lending because acquirers are almost as likely to have larger as well as smaller shares 
of small business loans in their portfolios, when compared to their targets. Karceski et 
al. (2000) assess the impact of bank consolidation on borrower’s welfare by analysing 
share price reactions of corporate borrowers to the merger announcement using a 
Norwegian data set. They find that small borrowers of target banks seem to benefit 
from small banking mergers, as reflected in a share price gain, while their share prices 
fall when two large banks merge. 
 
With respect to deposit-holders, Focarelli and Panetta (2002) find strong evidence that 
banking consolidation leads to rising deposit rates in the long run, thus overcoming 
possible adverse price changes immediately following a merger or acquisition. It is 
worth noting, however, that retail banking markets are overwhelmingly local and 
evidence suggests that strongly rising local bank concentration rates tend to be 
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associated with lower interest rates on deposits (e.g. Simons and Stavins, 1998). 
Similarly, Prager and Hannan (1998) demonstrate that a more pronounced decline in 
deposit rates is observable in those local markets where substantial horizontal banking 
mergers have taken place when compared to other markets where no such mergers 
have occurred. Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) fail to find higher bank margins in 
savings and time deposits in a European context, but find higher margins on loan 
interest rates and demand deposits.
14 Therefore, a disproportionate domestic 
consolidation may impact negatively on client welfare due to rising national banking 
concentration rates and consequently rising prices. Cross-border bank consolidation in 
segmented markets, though, could strengthen competition to the extent that market 
entry is facilitated (See Excursus following Section 3 for further discussion). 
Operating efficiency 
While the balance of evidence suggests that - in the absence of strongly concentrated 
banking markets - consolidation leads to welfare gains for clients, evidence of 
efficiency gains within consolidated banks seem to be much less clear-cut. In a meta-
examination, Rhoades (1994) considers thirty-nine empirical studies of bank 
consolidation and efficiency that were undertaken between 1980 and 1993. About half 
of the studies use an “operating-performance” approach, thus observing the financial 
performance of banks following a merger or acquisition. The other half comprises 
“event” studies, measuring the reaction of stock prices of acquirer and target banks, 
subsequent to a merger or acquisition announcement. The findings of the operating-
performance studies point to a lack of improvement in bank efficiency or profitability 
as a result of mergers, while results of the event studies fail to find rising stock prices 
– when prices of bidders and targets are combined - in response to mergers. In a more 
recent overview, Pilloff and Santomero (1997) fail to establish statistically significant 
post-merger gains, either in share value gains or in an improvement in performance 
indicators as derived from accounting data. Investigating bank consolidation benefits 
for various industrialised countries, Amel et al. (2002) find economies of scale mainly 
for mergers and acquisitions involving smaller banks, while convincing evidence for 
economies of scope or gains in managerial efficiency is not found.  
The absence of observed efficiency gains from bank consolidation may be explained 
by various efficiency barriers in bank mergers and acquisitions. In respect of cross-
border EU merger and acquisitions, Vander Vennet (2002) points out that the typical 
deal is characterised by the takeover of a poorly performing bank by a relatively 
efficient foreign bank. The paper finds evidence of an increase in realised profits, but 
not in operational efficiency, at least in the short term. The author explains these 
findings by reference to different legal and tax systems, which prevent the full 
exploitation of synergies in cross-border bank consolidation. A slightly differentiated 
picture is presented by Hughes et al. (2003), where the key for successful banking 
mergers is said to be efficient bank corporate governance structures. The analysis 
finds that an increase in acquired assets improves the financial performance of banks 
with less entrenched management – defined as a low proportion of the bank owned by 
management.  On the other hand, an increase in acquired assets tends to worsen 
performance of banks with a more entrenched management, which may prefer to 
                                                 
14 Akhavein  et al. (1997), though, do not find significant price changes for loans and deposits 
following mergers in their sample.  
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“build empires” rather than seek the most valuable acquisitions. The analysis suggests 
that acquisitions might allow an entrenched management to increase its consumption 
of agency goods (defined as perks) and also to avoid effort and risk.
15 The authors 
explain their result by suggesting that managers owning banks are better able to resist 
the pressure of market discipline, while a large share of outside owners can have an 
incentive to monitor management performance more strictly. 
A number of analyses argue that efficiency gains from bank consolidation are 
understated due to measurement problems. Unlike most studies which use financial 
data or estimates of managerial efficiency, Haynes and Thompson (1999) examine the 
impact of acquisitions on building society banks’ productivity over the period 1981-
1993 using a Cobb-Douglas production function approach. The authors find evidence 
of productivity gains from consolidation, whereby the effect is steadily increasing 
over a period of six or more years subsequent to an acquisition. This is explained by 
the gradual dismissal of initial retained staff, which had received employment 
assurances for an immediate post-acquisition period. This observation shows also that 
a short-term orientated assessment – such as possibly reflected in share price changes 
- might not always take longer term efficiency effects into account.  
Another reason for understating gains from banking-sector consolidation in US 
studies might be found in accounting rules, as discussed in a study by Kwan and 
Wilcox (1999). Two methods exist in the US General Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) to account for banking mergers and acquisitions - purchasing accounting and 
pooling-of-interest. In purchasing accounting, the difference between the (usually 
higher) purchasing price and the book value of the target’s bank equity (including its 
premises and equipment) is recorded as goodwill, an intangible asset. As intangible 
assets must be amortized and expensed, the consolidated bank’s depreciation charge 
and amortization expense will rise instantly, even if there is no change in performance 
of the consolidated bank after the merger. On the other hand, in pooling-of-interest 
accounting, the reported assets of the new consolidated bank would be equal to the 
sum of the reported assets of the two merging banks. The authors argue that a 
significant use of the purchasing accounting approach for reporting results and rising 
share prices after M&As (as was the case in the 1990s) would aggravate the negative 
effect on reported expenses. With data corrected for these factors, evidence is 
established of significant efficiency gains and reduced operating costs, both in terms 
of labour costs and other expenses. Finally, the analysis finds evidence of efficiency 
gains from bank consolidation. Huizinga et al. (2001) find improving cost efficiency 
for consolidating banks, both for large and small bank mergers, often especially 
pronounced when both banks portray poor pre-merger cost efficiency. 
Profit efficiency 
Cost efficiency is defined as a cost reduction per unit of output for a given set of 
output quantities and input prices. However, Akhavein et al. (1997) investigate profit 
efficiency, which is taking cost considerations and revenue considerations into 
account. Profit X-inefficiency is the failure of producing the highest value of output 
for a given set of input quantities and output prices. One example would be a profit X-
                                                 
15 A similar point is made by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) who observe that managers prefer to 
have a quiet live if they are insulated from takeovers.  
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inefficient firm which produces too few outputs for given inputs or is inside its 
production possibilities frontier.
16 Another example would be a profit inefficient firm 
operating on the production possibilities frontier but responding inadequately to 
relative prices and therefore producing too little of a high-priced output and too much 
of a low-priced output. In case customers prefer services (i) that can only provided by 
a larger firm or (ii) that are complementary to each other (one-stop shopping), profit 
efficiency can also be the function of scale or scope economics. For overall economic 
welfare an increase in the value of output – associated with higher profits - is equally 
beneficial than a decrease of costs. In their data set, merging banks tend to shift their 
output mixes towards high profit products, possibly because the new consolidated 
bank may have improved risk diversification opportunities allowing for a higher 
loan/asset ratio. Consequently, the authors demonstrate that their sample of merged 
banks significantly improved profit efficiency on average. Two alternative hypotheses 
- on why profit efficiency goes up following bank mergers - are advanced on the basis 
of available evidence. First, the relative efficiency hypothesis which states that the 
acquiring bank tends to bring the acquired bank towards its own level of efficiency, 
and the low efficiency hypothesis where the merger event would act like a “wake-up 
event” (possibly also used as an excuse), causing substantial restructuring and 
efficiency improvements to increase the profitability of both parts of the combined 
institution. 
Overall efficiency  
Banking mergers can also improve the sector’s overall efficiency and resilience to 
economic shocks. Beck et al. (2003) look at banks in 70 countries from 1980 to 1997 
and find a higher resilience to economic shocks in more consolidated banking systems 
with better diversified banks, which are also easier to monitor. On the other hand, too 
concentrated banking system might be subject to other forms of idiosyncratic risks 
undermining the financial system such as in case of scandals or fraud.  
One area where consolidation can clearly bring efficiency gains is in the elimination 
of excess capacity, particularly as the alternative method is through bank defaults. As 
DeYoung and Whalen (1994) find that failed banks are significantly less efficient than 
their peers, consolidation can be a means to eliminate relatively inefficient banks.  
 
3. Banking integration and consolidation 
3.1. Factors facilitating banking sector integration and consolidation  
Consistent with the economic rationale outlined above, several factors have combined 
to facilitate integration and consolidation within the EU banking sector over the past 
quarter of a century. These include (i) the globalisation of the international financial 
system due to the liberalisation of international capital movements and financial 
deregulation within countries; (ii) major technological advances, particularly in the 
field of data processing; (iii) improvements in the cross-border regulatory 
environment linked to the Single Market Programme and the introduction of the euro, 
                                                 
16 The concept of X-efficiency has been introduced by H. Leibenstein.  
- 13 -  
which has eliminated exchange risk in the bulk of financial flows within the EU; and 
(iv) a diminishing effect of so-called natural barriers such as language and culture.   
 
Globalisation is a broad phenomenon, encompassing social, cultural and technological 
integration. Economic factors – notably the consensus on the benefits to international 
trade and investment - have played a major part in promoting the globalisation 
process. In a narrower context, the liberalisation of capital movements - to finance the 
growth of international trade and investment – has had a specific impact in integrating 
the international financial system (IFS). An important feature of integration in the IFS 
has been the internationalisation of the banking sector. In consequence, an increasing 
number of banks have chosen to hold significant assets outside of their home 
jurisdiction.
17 To some extent, this internationalisation of balance sheets has been 
achieved by cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Globalisation of the IFS has been associated with a shift from bank-centred to market-
based financing. This shift has been reflected in the asset composition of banks, as 
higher-rated borrowers have turned to direct financing via the markets for commercial 
paper and corporate bonds. The result has been a dramatic change in the income 
profile of banks, with the proportion of interest income declining relative to income 
from more fee-based activities.  On the liability side, a search for yield has prompted 
an outflow of depositor funds from banks to a range of competing financial products.  
The relative decline in banks’ core business areas, combined with an increasing focus 
on shareholder value, has encouraged banks to look for attractive consolidation 
opportunities both domestically and abroad. 
 
Technological change has fostered bank consolidation, particularly to the extent that 
advances in information technology have led to declining costs for information 
collection, storage, processing and transformation.
  An obvious consequence of 
advanced information technology for banking has been the substitution of paper-based 
methods with computer and powerful telecommunication systems. The resulting 
centralisation of many services has yielded significant cost savings - not only in the 
back office but also in trading, brokerage etc. Internet and automated lending 
technologies have shaped new electronic delivery channels, enabling banks to enlarge 
their delivery capacity, and thereby facilitate the distribution of a wider array of 
products/services to a larger number of clients over a wider geographical area.
18 In 
addition, the harnessing of information technology has allowed tailored products to be 
targeted directly at specific clients.  
As technology has extended the range of services provided by the banking sector, 
distinctions between various service categories have become blurred (e.g. between 
banks and payment providers) and banks have increasingly engaged in non-traditional 
activities and non-banking institutions and securities firms have been able to make 
                                                 
17 In a study published in 2000, 38 out of the top 50 international banks are found to have at least 30 
per cent of their assets abroad. See: The Banker, internet edition, published 1 February 2000. 
18 Berger (2003) finds that technological advances have increased productivity and scale economies in 
processing electronic payments and have as well reduced costs, in some cases by more than 50 percent. 
One notable feature seems to be in that respect the adoption of small business credit scoring 
technology, which has enabled banks to lend to “marginal applicants” that might otherwise not have 
received bank credit.  
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inroads into traditional banking activities (e.g. loans, brokerages). In consequence, 
new technologies are said to have increased the optimum bank size, providing a 
powerful rationale for consolidation. 
Another key factor facilitating banking integration and consolidation has been 
regulatory reform. In the 1980s, there was a marked shift in government attitudes 
toward banking, which had long been treated as mercantilist industry and subject to 
considerable public-sector interference. The move away from a “government knows 
best” approach led to a relaxation in many constraints on the banking sector. Market 
discipline and risk-based capital guidelines were the hallmarks of the new era, 
replacing the extensive focus on safety concerns and protective regulations.
19 The new 
regulatory style supported a re-orientation towards more efficiency through 
competition, and encouraged a relaxation of a number of barriers previously hindering 
banking consolidation.
20 Moreover, efforts to promote an EU internal market in 
financial services intensified from the mid-1980s onwards, holding out the prospect of 
a much larger and more liquid “domestic” market for banks operating in the EU. In 
that respect, the introduction of home country supervisory control and the single 
licence raised hopes for EU banking sector integration and consolidation (see Sections 
4 and 5). The introduction of the euro – together with the accompanying infrastructure 
such as TARGET - signalled a step change in financial integration and, by eliminating 
exchange rate risk on the bulk of intra-EU financial flows, created the potential for 
economies of scale and scope within the financial sector - and more specifically 
banking.
21 This development might have also enhanced the attractiveness of the EU as 
a banking market for third country banks.  
So-called “natural” barriers to banking consolidation emerge in the form of national-
based market differences, which relate to language, cultural preferences and 
considerations of geographical proximity. While such barriers are very difficult to 
overcome completely, developments in recent years have mitigated their effect. For 
example, barriers related to geographical distance or a high cost of cross-border 
information and communication have been eased by advances in information 
technology (e.g. wider Internet access) and by lower telecommunication prices due to 
liberalisation. In this way, many natural barriers now represent management 
challenges rather than insurmountable obstacles.
22 
 
                                                 
19 It is noteworthy that the coming implementation of the Basel agreement (Basel II) would allow some 
banking institutions to use less capital for their operations, allowing therefore the freed-up capital to be 
used for other activities, including for a renewed focus on Mergers and Acquisitions.  
20 For example Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argue that in competitive environments, like manufacturing 
and in the telecommunication industry, capacity has the tendency to go to high productivity plants, 
making thus the overall sector more productive. The study provides evidence that deregulating banking 
markets may have had a similar effect on US banks with the link between performance and market 
share increasing significantly over time.  
21 See for a discussion Kleimeier and Sander (2002) and Cabral et al. (2002). 
22 Berger and DeYoung (2000) suggest that efficient organisations can overcome distance effects and 
there may be no optimal geographic scope for banking institutions.  
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3.2. Consolidation in the EU banking sector 
Bank consolidation has progressed rapidly in the Member States of the EU 15 since 
the introduction of the euro, however, cross-border consolidation is lagging behind. 
Domestically-owned banks continue to dominate their domestic banking sector, 
except for some retail market integration movements which achieved integration on a 
limited scale, such as in the Benelux and Nordic countries.
23  
Consolidation within Member States 
An examination of trends in consolidation within Member States reveals a sharply 
declining number of credit institutions. Between 1997 and 2003, the number of credit 
institutions fell by almost 35% in Germany, by over 25% in France and the 
Netherlands and in excess of 20% in the United Kingdom. In Belgium the number of 
institutions has declined by more than 17%. Running counter to this generalised trend, 
the number of credit institutions in Ireland increased by almost 13%, while the 
respective numbers advanced as well in Greece (7,3%) and in Finland (5,2%). 
Calculating EU and euro-area aggregates based on these national numbers, the 
number of credit institutions declined by 23,7% in the euro area and by more than 
22% in the EU15 according to the most recent data available (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Number of credit institutions, change in % 




Belgium  131  123 117 118 112 111 108  -17,6 
Denmark  213  212 210 210 203 178 203 -4,7 
Germany  3420  3238 2992 2742 2526 2363 2225 -34,9 
Greece  55  59 57 57 61 61 59  7,3 
Spain  416  404 387 368 366 359 348  -16,3 
France  1258  1226 1158 1099 1050  989  939 -25,4 
Ireland  71  78 81 81 88 85 80  12,7 
Italy  909  934 890 861 843 821 801  -11,9 
Luxembourg  215  212 211 202 194 184 172  -20,0 
Netherlands  648  634 616 586 561 539 481  -25,8 
Austria  928  898 875 848 836 823 814  -12,3 
Portugal  238  227 224 218 212 202 200  -16,0 
Finland  348  348 346 341 369 369 366 5,2 
Sweden  237  223 212 211 211 216 222 -6,3 
UK  537  521 496 491 452 451 426  -20,7 
Euro area 12  8637  8361 7954 7521 7218 6906 6593 -23,7 
EU 15  9624  9337 8872 8433 8084 7751 7444 -22,7 
Source: European Central Bank (2004): Table 1, own calculations.  
 
Further evidence of bank consolidation can be found by examining the number of 
local banking units (branches). Here, the number of banking units declined by 46% in 
the Netherlands, by over 32% in Belgium, and by slightly more than 25% in 
Germany. In contrast, the number of local units increased significantly in Greece 
                                                 
23  Unlike wholesale market activities like inter-bank and investment banking activities which are more 
integrated. 
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(31,5%), Italy (19,1%) and in Portugal (14,6%). For the euro area and EU15 the 
number of branches declined by 7,4% and 8,0% respectively.   
 
Table 2: Number of local banking units, change in % 




Belgium  7358 7129 6982 6616 6168 5550 4989 -32,2 
Denmark  2283 2291 2294 2365 2376 2128 2118 -7,2 
Germany  63186 59929 58546 56936 53931 50867 47351 -25,1 
Greece  2510 2779 2850 3004 3134 3263 3300 31,5 
Spain  38039 39039 39376 39311 39024 39021 39762  4,5 
France  25464 25428 25501 25657 26049 26162 25789  1,3 
Ireland  942  1026  977 880 970 926 924 -1,9 
Italy  25601 26748 27134 28177 29270 29926 30502  19,1 
Luxembourg  318 324 345 335 274 271 269  -15,4 
Netherlands  6800 6787 6258 5983 5207 4610 3671 -46,0 
Austria  4691 4587 4589 4570 4561 4466 4395 -6,3 
Portugal  4746 4947 5401 5662 5534 5390 5440 14,6 
Finland  1289 1254 1193 1202 1257 1267 1252 -2,9 
Sweden  2521 2197 2140 2059 2040 2040 2061 -18,2 
UK  16344 15854 15387 14756 14554 14392 14186 -13,2 
Euro area 12  180944 179977 179152 178333 175379 171719 167644  -7,4 
EU 15  202092 200319 198973 197513 194349 190279 186009  -8,0 
Source: European Central Bank (2004): Table 2; own calculations 
The reduction of local banking units per 100.000 inhabitants is even slightly more 
pronounced (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Number of local banking units per 100.000 inhabitants, change in % 




Belgium  72 70 68 65 60 54 48  -33,3
Denmark  43 43 43 44 44 40 39  -9,3
Germany  77 73 71 69 65 62 57  -26,0
Greece  23 26 26 28 29 30 30  30,4
Spain  97 99 99 98 97 96 97  0,0
France  43 42 42 42 43 43 42  -2,3
Ireland  26 28 26 23 25 24 23  -11,5
Italy  45 46 47 49 51 52 52  15,6
Luxembourg  76 76 80 76 62 61 60  -21,1
Netherlands  44 43 40 38 32 29 23  -47,7
Austria  59 58 57 57 57 55 54  -8,5
Portugal  47 49 53 55 54 52 52  10,6
Finland  25 24 23 23 24 24 24  -4,0
Sweden  28 25 24 23 23 23 23  -17,9
UK  28 27 26 25 25 24 24  -14,3
Euro area 12  60 59 59 58 57 56 54  -10,0
EU 15  54 53 53 52 51 50 49  -9,3
Source: European Central Bank (2004): Table 3; own calculations 
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Trends in cross-border consolidation 
An examination of trends in cross-border bank consolidation reveals a rather mixed 
picture at the wholesale level (bank-to-bank or bank-to-large companies) but very 
little evidence of consolidation at the retail level.
24 No truly “Pan-European bank” has 
emerged at the retail level and the market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries 
in other Member States is low, except in the case of some smaller Member States such 
as the Benelux and the Nordic region. Evidence of fragmentation in the retail market 
is found in the dispersion of company loan and household interest rates, although the 
dispersion has trended downwards in recent years (with the exception of consumer 
loans). Differences in bank profitability across countries are another indication of 
fragmentation. Direct cross-border provision of traditional banking services remains 
small in absolute terms and seems relevant only for large customers.  
Foreign banks in recently acceded EU Member States
25 
 
Most of the recently acceded EU Member States are special in that they exhibit an 
elevated level of foreign-owned banks. Although foreign ownership of banks in the 
new Member States has occurred outside the current Community framework for 
financial integration a combination of factors (some of them one-off) seem to explain 
the phenomenon of a high market share of foreign owned banks.
26  
Banks previously operating under a centrally-planned regime were ill-prepared to 
meet the challenges of the transition to a market-based economy, lacking the 
necessary risk management skills and a capacity for effective scrutiny of lending. In 
consequence, many governments decided to embark on major privatisation processes 
by inviting foreign institutions to enter the market - bringing with them the necessary 
know-how and experience. In addition, the relatively strong economic performance of 
these Member States, partly due to a catching-up process, transformed them into an 
attractive market for foreign banks. Anticipation of EU membership might have 
played a role as well.   
The resulting share of foreign-owned banks is especially high in Estonia (97,3%), the 
Czech Republic (96%), Slovakia (96,3%) and Lithuania (95,6%). The market share of 
foreign-owned banks amounts to 83,3% in Hungary, 67,8% in Poland and 67,6% in 
Malta. In contrast, the share of foreign banks is below 50% in Latvia (47,2%), 






                                                 
24 See European Commission (2004a and 2004b). Other Papers discussing EU banking integration 
would be for example: Baele et al. (2004), Cabral et al. (2002), Corvoisier and Gropp (2001), Dermine 
(2002), Kleimeier and Sander (2002) and Vander Vennet (2002). For a short survey see Manna (2004).    
25 The figures on asset shares of foreign-owned banks are based on European Central Bank (2005).  
26 This might also explain the relative high level of concentration in the recently acceded EU Member 
States. On concentration values see European Central Bank (2005).  
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Excursus: Rising concentration ratios and consumer welfare 
 
As the demand side of EU retail banking remains largely fragmented between 
Member States, national concentration ratios are a useful guide for measuring 
competition. Here, the consequence of the rapid pace of domestic consolidation and 
the absence of cross-border consolidation is a rise in concentration ratios at the 
national level as measured in asset terms of the 5 largest domestic banks (see Table 
4).
27 Since 1997, the rise in domestic concentration ratios has been notable in Belgium 
(+29), Portugal (+17), Spain (+12) and Greece (+11). Only three Member States 
(Denmark, Finland and Sweden) experienced a decline in their respective 
concentration ratios, although one of them, Finland, exhibits a still very high 
concentration rate. Similarly, the degree of concentration is already very high in some 
of the Member States not witnessing a sharp advance in concentration ratios, such as 
for example in the Netherlands with an index level of 84.  
 
 
Table 4: Asset share of 5 largest banks and change 
Country/Year  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  97-03 
change 
Belgium  54 63 76 75 78 82 83  +29 
Denmark  70 71 71 60 68 68 67 -3 
Germany  17 19 19 20 20 20 22 +5 
Greece  56 63 67 65 67 67 67  +11 
Spain  32 35 41 46 45 44 44  +12 
France  40 41 43 47 47 45 47 +7 
Ireland  41 40 41 41 43 46 44 +3 
Italy  25 25 25 23 29 31 27 +2 
Luxembourg  23 25 26 26 28 30 32 +9 
Netherlands 79 82 82 81 83 83 84 +5 
Austria  44 42 41 43 45 46 44  0 
Portugal  46 45 44 59 60 60 63  +17 
Finland  88 86 86 87 80 79 81 -7 
Sweden  58 56 56 57 55 56 54 -4 
UK  24 25 28 28 29 30 33 +9 
Source: ECB (2004), Table 6, own calculations. 
 
 
Another way of examining concentration ratios in the domestic banking sector is by 
using the Herfindahl index for bank’s total assets. The index, which is here defined as 
the sum of the squares of the asset shares of each individual bank, can range from a 
number close to 0 (atomic competition) to 10.000 (a single monopolistic firm). 
According to those numbers, only Denmark (-317) and Sweden (-70) witnessed an 
                                                 
27 Although the few banks created through cross-border M&As might be included in some national 
concentration ratios, it would seem that foreign bank entry on a large scale should drive concentration 
ratios downward or have at least a neutral effect: First, one might point out that in a fully integrated EU 
market customers would have many more options when compared with the current segmented domestic 
markets. As a consequence, an integrated EU market (a larger market) would very likely exhibit lower 
concentration ratios. This reflection is also supported on an empirical level by the observation that 
larger EU Member States seem to have clearly lower concentration ratios when compared with smaller 
Member States. Second, even if the EU retail market is segmented nationally, the difference between 
domestic and cross-border M&As is that the latter do not change the concentration ratios, while 
domestic M&As do.  
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index decline, while all other EU 15 Member States experienced index increases, 
whereby especially strong advances are noted in Belgium (+1366), but also to a lesser 
extent in Portugal (+467), Greece (+245), Spain (+236) and Finland (+270). Equally 
noteworthy are the relatively high index levels in Finland (2420), Belgium (2065) and 
in the Netherlands (1744). In contrast, the index level of Germany (173) and Italy 
(240) are relatively low.  
 
Table 5: Herfindahl index for bank’s total assets and index change 




Belgium  699  909  1518 1506 1587 1905 2065  +1366 
Denmark  1431 1442 1499  863  1119 1145 1114 -317 
Germany  114 133 140 151 158 163 173 +59 
Greece  885 1165 986 1122  1113 1164 1130 +245 
Spain  285 329 441 581 551 529 521  +236 
France  449 485 509 587 606 551 597  +148 
Ireland  500 473 480 486 512 553 562 +62 
Italy  201 210 220 190 260 270 240 +39 
Luxembourg 210 222 236 242 275 296 315  +105 
Netherlands  1654 1802 1700 1694 1762 1788 1744  +90 
Austria  515 515 511 548 561 618 557 +42 
Portugal  577 575 566 986 991 963  1044  +467 
Finland  2150 2120 1960 2050 2240 2050 2420 +270 
Sweden  830 790 790 800 760 800 760 -70 
UK  208 221 250 264 282 307 347  +139 
Source: ECB (2004), Table 7, own calculations. 
 
While the evidence on pricing power does not indicate a widespread problem with 
competition, concentration in domestic banking sectors could imply that the benefits 
of consolidation fail to filter down to the consumer. Some have even suggested that 
the rationale for the large amount of domestic M&As when compared to cross-border 
M&As derives from the fact that domestic M&As increase market power while cross-
border M&As do not.  
 
It is also often claimed that another consequence of the lack of an integrated EU 
banking environment might be that competition policy would limit the capacity of 
banks in smaller Member States to achieve sufficient size to compete on a regional or 
global level – as domestic consolidation would more rapidly lead to problems of 
excessive market share. The cited interaction of competition policy and consolidation 
within domestic markets might therefore indirectly favour banks in larger Member 







                                                 
28 However, critics of that assertion contend that this “critical mass” argument is overstated and that 
intensive ex-ante domestic M&A activity could make international expansion even more difficult due 
to the additional debt burden and reorganisation effort that M&A activities usually entail. 
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4. Avenues for cross-border bank consolidation within the EU  
 
Integration of the EU banking sector can proceed along three different avenues, 
namely through (i) organic growth in the form of foreign branches and subsidiaries; 
(ii) consolidation via cross-border mergers and acquisitions; and (iii) the provision of 
services on a cross-border basis, allowing customers to choose banking products 
freely from their country of choice. This section examines the extent of obstacles to 
integration along each of these avenues.  
 
4.1. Organic growth in the form of foreign branches and subsidiaries 
 
Current EU legislation on banking aims to facilitate organic growth by granting each 
bank a license valid in all of the Member States, enabling them to establish a foreign 
branch which is subject to home-country supervision.
29 The objective is to allow a 
bank from one Member State to enter the domestic market of other Member States 
without the need to report to multiple supervisors. As a bank operating across borders 
via subsidiaries is subject to host-country supervision in each and every Member State 
- in addition to home-country supervision on a consolidated basis, it would be 
expected that organic growth across borders would occur mainly via branches and not 
subsidiaries. In fact, cross-border bank integration has taken place substantially 
through the establishment of subsidiaries. The number of subsidiaries of other 
European Economic Area Countries (EEA, involving EU Member States plus Iceland, 
Norway and Lichtenstein) in EU Member States reached 333 in 2002 with a market 
share (based on assets) of 19 % when compared with overall GDP in 2001 (latest 
figure available for EU15); and 23 % in the euro area (already figures for 2002 
available). While the corresponding number of   cross-border branches in the EU is 
clearly higher at 571, the market share in terms of assets amounted to only 24 percent 
of GDP, only slightly above the share recorded for subsidiaries.
30 
 
The relatively even split between the use of foreign-based branches and subsidiaries is 
surprising, given the apparent advantages of a branch-based structure in terms of 
supervisory compliance costs. Several factors may explain this outcome. For example, 
Dermine (2002) presents a list of possible explanatory factors, such as, among others, 
(i) that the creation of a subsidiary would help to insulate the mother company from 
business risk avoiding therefore investor worries about risk shifting towards far-away 
places; (ii) that the probability of a consolidated branch defaulting would be lower 
when compared to a subsidiary structure; a subsidiary structure would therefore allow 
for exploiting the deposit insurance put option in case a subsidiary was to face 
difficulties; (iii) the possibility of a separate stock market listing.  
 
The inability of a bank to consolidate after a cross-border merger or acquisition is 
likely to act as another obstacle to the creation of a European banking groups, 
                                                 
29 A branch is understood to be a legally dependent part of a credit institution (a bank, for the purpose 
of this paper), fully allowed to carry out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of 
banks. It is worth noting that any number legally dependent parts set up in the same Member State by a 
single non-domestically authorised credit institution is regarded as a single branch.  
30 European Commission (2004b).  
- 21 -  
although the European Company Statute may offer a partial remedy in this regard (see 
the discussion on “Restrictions deriving from company law” in Section 4.2.).  
 
More fundamentally, however, the idea that banks would rush to establish branches in 
other Member States may have been illusory in view of the fact that banks require 
local knowledge for screening clients, resulting in the need of a proprietary 
information accumulation.
31 As each loan applicant presents a specific adverse 
selection problem, banks already active in a specific market have an informational 
advantage over new entrants, not only in respect of potential clients but also in respect 
of local market characteristics. Supporting those arguments, economic research 
suggests that foreign banks tend to have lower interest margins, lower profitability 
than their domestic rivals (Claessens et al., 2001).
32 Banks would, therefore, be 
expected to hesitate in establishing greenfield operations in other Member States – 
especially for retail clients - and may prefer to enter a foreign banking market through 
mergers or acquisitions.
33 However, numerous obstacles lie along this avenue also.  
4.2. Cross-border consolidation 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are another possible avenue for integration in 
the EU banking sector. Mergers can be defined as the combination of two 
organisations (with comparable size) into one legal entity. Acquisitions are 
transactions where one firm purchases a controlling stake of another one, without 
necessarily combining the involved firm’s assets. According to the available data, 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions have not been a major feature of the EU 
banking sector. In terms of numbers, mergers and acquisitions among domestic credit 
institutions represent about 80 percent of total consolidation activity in the EU in each 
year since 1992
34 (see Graph 1). The only clear pickup in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions is evident in the run up to the creation of the single market in 1992, when 
the share of domestic mergers fell to about 60 per cent. However, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions have never come close to exceeding domestic mergers and 





                                                 
31 See Marquez (2002) and also Kaas (2003) models on bank entry.  
32 While the reverse seems to be the case for foreign banks in developing countries. 
33 The banking group Nordea provides an interesting – and unusual - example as it pursued first cross-
border M&As and has been only at a latter stage trying to convert the Group’s legal structure through a 
Societas Europeae into branches (Nordea, 2003).  
34 Source of graph 1 and 2: Competition Databases: General Statistics on Mergers and Acquisitions; 
extraction 3 March 2004; DG Ecfin E2; data comprise completed as well as announced M&As; Data 
include all EU financial firm mergers from any of the following sectors as bidders into the depository 
banks as target sector: depository institutions, nondepository institutions and security and commodity 
brokers; Own calculations. A number of sources confirm a low level of banking cross-border M&As, 
for example in Schich and Kikuchi (2003) and Buch and DeLong (2001).  
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Graph 1: share of domestic, cross-border depository institutions on overall M&As in numbers 
Depository Institutions M&As in numbers: 



























The dominance of domestic consolidation in total is even more remarkable in terms of 
value (see Graph 2), accounting for a share of about 90% or more in thirteen out of 
the last seventeen years and falling below 70% only in 1989. A possible explanation 
for the different outcomes in terms of numbers and value may be that EU banks 




Graph 2: share of domestic, cross-border depository institutions on overall M&As in value 
Depository institutions M&As in value: 



























                                                 
35 Wall Street Journal, 2003. 
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The divergence between bank consolidation at the domestic and cross-border levels is 
striking in light of the fact that factors facilitating consolidation seem to be present at 
both levels. Accordingly, it is likely that offsetting obstacles exist at the cross-border 
level linked to different market evolutions in terms of different market practices, 
taxation systems, accounting procedures, legal issues etc. Another aspect would be 
that national banking systems may have evolved differently due to deeply rooted 
cultural and political preferences, possibly preventing full EU banking integration 
even in the absence of any kind of barriers. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that some obstacles have been erected with the specific purpose of 
preventing cross-border consolidation (see Box).  
 
 
Box: Rationale for cross-border banking M&A barriers  
Banking-sector consolidation can be controversial, with proponents stressing the 
benefits of increased synergies and cost-savings and opponents warning of job losses 
and the regularity of failed business strategies. Cross-border consolidation can be 
particularly controversial because of the inevitable foreign dimension in any transfer 
of ownership. While concerns relating to cross-border bank consolidation may be 
legitimate, the existence of “hidden national agendas” cannot be excluded. For 
example, some have argued that economic openness and international financial 
integration pose a threat to the domestic corporate establishment, which is able to 
finance most of its projects through retained earnings and so does not need a 
competitive banking system.
36 It has also been suggested that domestic banks may 
oppose foreign entry in an effort to limit competition. As government authorities are 
involved in the banking sector – often as bank owners and more often as supervisors – 
national vested interests cannot be excluded as a possible obstacle. In this context, 
some observers have pointed to “state-induced” barriers to integration, such as 
explicit and implicit rules against foreign competitors which are sometimes 
accompanied by strategies to create national champions.
37 38 One observer sums up the 
EU situation in the banking sector with the following words (Boot, 1999): 
“The domestic banks in Europe were – and are – protected as domestic flagships. A 
fundamental belief that financial institutions should not be controlled by foreigners 
has (so far) almost prevented any cross-border merge …central banks, ministries of 
finance and the banks operate in close concert. This is not very surprising: a very 
homogenous group of executives is in charge of the financial sector, central bank and 
government ministries guaranteeing a clear national identity of domestic institutions. 
                                                 
36 See Rajan and Zingales (2001, 2003) 
37 See Berger et al. (2000).  
38 See for example Standard & Poor’s (2001), stating on page 5: “The influence of domestic … 
regulators should not be underestimated. Political intervention has played a big part in countries such 
as Italy, Portugal, and France, where governments have intervened to block outside predators. In these 
countries, the priority remains the emergence of national champions, strong enough to compete on an 
international basis.”  
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In countries with explicit government involvement....foreign control over domestic 
institutions is even more unlikely...unless banks become so inefficient and weak that 
involvement of foreigners becomes almost inevitable.” 
 
 
Barriers to cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
In this section, three broad categories of barriers to cross-border bank integration and 
consolidation are identified: investment restrictions, differences in taxation and a lack 
of common financial reporting.
39 
4.2.1. Investment restrictions 
 
Inward investment restrictions are one of the most obvious examples of government 
intervention to protect national companies and thus potentially impede cross-border 
consolidation. These restrictions can take several forms, the most important of which 
are:  
Special public control rights of Member States 
 
Wide-ranging restrictions on investments in the Member States were replaced in the 
1990s by narrower and more subtle investment restrictions, which focus on liberalised 
sectors and, more generally, on privatised companies. While the latest generation of 
restrictions does not formally discriminate against foreign investors, the 
predominance of domestic actors in privatisations and in mergers and acquisitions 
over the past ten years provides circumstantial evidence of a possible bias in favour of 
domestic consolidation. Further evidence is to be found in adopted laws, which have 
incorporated often admissible exceptions to the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
capital movements such as ‘defence’, ‘public security’, ‘public order’, or the concept 
of ‘general interest’ established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
40 The 
intention would be to ensure that national restrictions are deemed compatible with the 
Community framework.  
 
Although ‘defence’-related considerations were clearly definable, the exact scope of 
the other exceptions was much more difficult to determine. In this respect, many 
Member States drew their inspiration from the wave of privatisations in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s, when ‘golden shares’ were heavily used and usually 
                                                 
39All barriers affect banking cross-border mergers directly, although some hinder uniquely the banking 
sector, while others apply to broader sectors of the economy doing cross-border business. The focus is 
on the cross-border aspect of those barriers. Other obstacles, such as stifling labour law restrictions, 
possibly complicating post-M&A restructuring are not mentioned as those kind of barriers are equally 
relevant for purely domestic M&As. The listed barriers might to varying degrees equally be relevant 
for other sectors of the economy as well, not just the banking sector.  
40 More precisely, the ECJ refers in its rulings to “overriding requirements of the general interest linked 
to strategic imperatives and the need to ensure continuity in public services”. 
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justified by the need to protect vital national interests.
41 In its rulings on such 
restrictions, the ECJ has confirmed that some specific economic activities fall within 
the ambit of a legitimate public interest (e.g. energy supply, telecommunication 
services). However, commercial banking activities in the traditional sense would not 
and so impediments to cross-border banking sector consolidation cannot be justified 
by ‘general interest’ considerations. Accordingly, some Member States have already 
been condemned and been required to remove existing investment restrictions 
affecting specific banks (see box).  
 
Box: Investment Restrictions for Specific Banks – some recent examples 
 
In Portugal, the Framework Law on Privatisation N° 11/90 of 5 April 1990 provided 
powers to set limits on foreign participation in companies that were being privatised, 
while Decree-Law 65/94 fixed in 1994 a ceiling of 25% on the participation of 
foreigners in already privatised companies. Several Decree-Laws implementing the 
above provisions applied to specific Portuguese banks: Banco Totta & Açores, 
Credito Predial Português, Banco Fonsecas & Burnay, Banco Espírito Santo & 
Comercia de Lisboa, Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa, and Banco Português do 
Atlântico. Although the above legislation was declared illegal by the ECJ in its ruling 
of 4 June 2002, the case is not yet been resolved insofar as Portugal has not removed 
these restrictions so far. 
In Spain, the Privatisation Law N° 5/1995 of 23 March 1995 applied to firms in which 
the State owned more than 25% of the shares in 1995. When the participation of the 
State in these undertakings is either reduced, via a sale of 10% or more, to less than 
50%, or becomes less than 15%, prior authorisation can be required for dissolution, 
sale of assets, change in business aims, and the acquisition by any investor of 10% of 
the share capital. Such a procedure had been introduced for a limited duration in six 
privatised companies, and in particular in Corporación Bancaria de España SA 
(Argentaria). The ECJ declared the above legislation illegal in its ruling of 13 May 
2003 (the authorisation mechanism of Argentaria had elapsed in the meantime). 
  
 
Restrictions deriving from company law 
 
The inability of firms to consolidate after a successful cross-border merger or 
acquisition – either because certain operations are impossible (i.e. not foreseen by 
national company law) or because they result in a costly and time consuming 
winding-up – acts as another obstacle to the creation of European banking groups. In 
this respect, the European Company  Statute offers a partial remedy. The Statute, 
which was established in 2001 and entered into force in 2004, gives companies 
operating in more than one Member State the possibility of establishing as a single 
company, with a single management and reporting system as well as a single set of 
                                                 
41 While the United Kingdom chose to enforce its control rights over privatised companies through 
specific legal means (i.e. the attachment of special rights to one share of the company’s capital), other 
Member States opted for the insertion of such privileges in provisions of public law. 
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rules.
42 
43 However, several issues are not covered by the Statute and remain subject 
to national law (e.g. insolvency, intellectual property, taxation). Problems with cross-
border operations may persist also because of national differences in inserting the EC 
regulation governing the statute in their legislative framework.
44 Finally, companies 
established in Member States, where employee participation is not required, may be 
deterred by the mandatory negotiations with employee representatives that are 
contained in the Statute.
45 
Removing restrictions deriving from company law has also been the focus of the 
Directive on Takeover Bids, which was adopted at the end of 2003. However, serious 
doubts have been expressed about the effectiveness of the Directive, since national 
authorities are given ample scope to deviate from the central rules. For example, the 
Directive embodies the principle of reciprocity, whereby Member States are allowed 
to exempt domestic companies – without obliging them to do so - from the ban on 
anti-takeover devices when the bidding company comes from a jurisdiction permitting 
their use.
46  
It should be pointed out that these different layers of optional exemptions - at Member 
State and company level - actually favour a further fragmentation of the market 
instead of its integration. Each Member State will have its own policy in this area and, 
within each Member State, companies will have the option to define their own policy 
with respect to takeover bids. This means implicitly that any takeover plan will have 
to be preceded by a preliminary assessment of the legal background applicable on the 
target company and on the bidding company. Moreover, since the “reciprocity 
principle” implies a comparative assessment of measures which have been drafted at 
national level by different Member States, it could be argued that substantial legal 
uncertainty will remain, even in the case where ‘integration friendly’ options would 





                                                 
42 Council Regulation (EC) N° 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company 
(SE). 
43 A similar harmonisation process for cooperative societies led to the adoption of the statute for a 
European Cooperative Society in 2003, complemented by employee involvement provisions, entering 
into force by mid-2006. For the European Corporative Society Council Regulation (EC) N° 1435/2003 
of 22 July 2003 and Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22  July 2003 supplementing the Statute 
regarding the involvement of employees. 
44 In addition, some corporate groups maintain separate subsidiaries in various jurisdictions for tax 
reasons and might be reluctant to put these benefits at risk by creating a European Company.  
45 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company 
with regard to the involvement of employees. 
46 This concerns restrictions on securities transfers and voting rights as well as the right of the board of 
the target company to issue shares, without prior shareholder authorisation (“poison pills”). Directive 
2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids. 
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Restrictions deriving from prudential considerations 
 
The Community legislation on the control of concentrations between undertakings
47 
states that Member States may take appropriate measures to protect several categories 
of legitimate interests. In particular, prudential rules are regarded as legitimate 
interests. Therefore, a Member State can adopt measures with regard to a 
concentration of community dimension in order to protect prudential interests without 
previously requesting approval by the Commission. 
However, the term “prudential interests” has a specific meaning in Community law 
implying implicitly that Member States have to ensure that interests they consider as 
being prudential are also recognised as such by Community legislation. In particular, 
the Council interpreted that prudential interests would cover measures aimed at 
ensuring the good repute of individuals managing such undertakings, the honesty of 
transactions and the rules of solvency. Furthermore, these fairly broad concepts 
should be further interpreted in the light of the ongoing process of harmonisation of 
prudential rules at EU level.
48 Therefore, while a Member State has a right of 
initiative with respect to the adoption of prudential rules in the context of 
concentrations between undertakings, it is also responsible for ensuring the 
compliance of the detailed measures adopted with Community legislation. As far as 
the banking sector is concerned, it can be argued that in the past decade several 
Member States have misused their right of adopting prudential measures in order to 
fend off unwanted foreign interests in national banks (see Box). 
 
Box: An illustrative example 
A well-known illustration of the trend of fending off unwanted foreign interests in 
national banks was displayed when the Spanish Banco Santander Central Hispano 
(BSCH) tried to acquire a reference stake in the Portuguese financial group 
Champalimaud (1999-2000). The group Champalimaud was majority owner of 
insurance company Mondial Confiança S.A., and the latter owned more than 50% of 
the capital of several Portuguese banks (Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor; Banco Totta & 
Açores; Banco Chemical Finance; Crédito Predial Português). In this particular case, 
the Portuguese authorities held out for so long against the break up of the 
Champalimaud group that Commission involvement had been necessary to guarantee 
the application of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.  
The initial negative decision of the Portuguese authorities referred essentially to 
alleged prudential considerations. In particular, due to the lack of clarity and 
transparency of the group resulting from the operation, negative repercussions for the 
stability of the insurance undertaking in question and the financial group depending 
on it was often cited. In addition, the possibility of an appropriate supervision of the 
group had been questioned. However, the decision of the Portuguese authorities failed 
to explain or justify why this operation would have such damaging consequences. As 
                                                 
47 Council Regulation (EEC) N° 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings 
48 Notes on Council Regulation 4064/89 
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far as the supervision argument is concerned, this would have been especially difficult 
since BSCH was a well-known financial entity which controlled then already two 
banking subsidiaries in Portugal, duly authorised by the Portuguese authorities. 
The above appears to demonstrate a typical reasoning followed by Member States 
when confronted with the possibility of intra-EU cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector. On the one hand, the creation of national 
champions is informally encouraged by the government. On the other hand, attempts 
at acquisition by foreign operators are challenged on the basis of relevant 
competences which remain, at least partially, in Member States’ hands, such as 
prudential rules. Although Community law and, if needed, Commission involvement 
should ultimately guarantee the full implementation of the right of establishment of 
the free movement of capital, the prospect of lengthy negotiations with the authorities 
of the target country may lead some acquiring banks to renounce their cross-border 
acquisition plans or at least amend them. 
 
4.2.2. Taxation issues 
Corporate taxation remains a national responsibility and conflicting (or unclear) 
national tax systems can lead to uncertainty with respect to the applicable tax 
jurisdiction and to double taxation. Even when such difficulties can be avoided, the 
administrative burden due to specific and diverging compliance requirements can be 
prohibitive. The tax-related barriers, which are most relevant in terms of hampering 
cross-border bank consolidation, are:  
Income flows between associated companies  
Income flows between company groups - mainly dividends, interest rate payments 
and royalties - are not subject to double taxation, if covered by EU Directives. 
However, the narrow scope of the Directives and implementation problems at 
Member State level often render the provisions inapplicable, thereby undermining 
incentives for cross-border consolidation. For example, the “Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive” aims to avoid the double taxation of dividends, but dividends are only 
covered by the Directive if the recipient company holds at least a direct 25% capital 
stake in the foreign company, with indirect holdings not taken into account.
49 If the 
recipient company is not incorporated as one of the eligible legal forms, dividends do 
not fall under the Directive’s scope. This leaves out legal company forms created after 
1990 or omitted from the list by the time of adoption (e.g. Belgian co-operative 
societies, some Irish banking companies). In addition, it is often said that some 
Member States interpret the foreseen “anti-abuse” clause (built-in to deny the 
Directive’s application to non-EU held entities) excessively, which led the ECJ to 
declare as discriminatory some derived national provisions. In mid-2003, the 
Commission has proposed to extend the list of eligible legal company forms and 
                                                 
49 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. 
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lowering the threshold from 25% to 10% for the status of parent and subsidiary 
company.
50  
Starting from January 2004 onwards, interest and royalties payments are covered by 
another Directive; however similar provisions as in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
would suggest that its application is likely to suffer similar problems.
51 Here too, the 




Cross-border restructuring operations 
 
In order to guarantee the same treatment as in a domestic context, the fiscal treatment 
of cross-border restructuring operations following mergers and acquisitions is 
partially harmonised at EU level through the “Merger Directive”. However, diverging 
national merger rules, a narrow scope and transposition problems hamper its 
application. The Merger Directive prohibits charging capital gains tax on initially tax 
exempt assets such as provisions and reserves and ensures that cross-border 
restructuring are subject to the same tax rules as those applied to similar domestic 
operations.
53 Furthermore, the Directive prohibits the taxation of share exchanges, 
although Member States may get tax profits generated by a subsequent share sale. 
However, the list of eligible companies is limited and important tax types are not 
covered, 
54 for example transfer taxes on immovable property (e.g. land registration 
taxes) as well as some taxes on restructuring operations (e.g. the centralisation of 
activities initially located in several Member States into a single Member State). The 
Commission has recently made a proposal to rectify some of the identified problems, 
which would also expand the Directive’s scope to include as well a partial company 
division (“split off”), where the transferring company continues to exist.
55 
Loss-compensation  
In a domestic context, a company can consolidate its profits and losses at group level 
and pay only taxes on the remaining surplus. This is not always possible on a cross-
                                                 
50 To include as well banking sector relevant cooperatives, mutual companies, certain non-capital based 
companies, saving banks, funds and associations with commercial activity, adding ‘European 
Company’ and ‘European Cooperative Society’. 
51 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest 
and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States. 
52 Commission proposal of 30 December 2003 for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/49/EC 
(COM(2003) 841 final). 
53 Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to 
mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different 
Member States. 
54 The positive effects of the “Merger Directive” can only be felt once national legislation allows 
companies to be absorbed or divided by foreign companies. At present, only cross-border transfers of 
assets or exchanges of shares can be undertaken in all Member States.  
55 Commission proposal of 17 October 2003 for a Council Directive amending Directive 90/434/EEC 
of 23 July 1990 (COM(2003) 613 final). 
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border level. While losses incurred by foreign branches may usually be offset at the 
level of the parent company (subject to special conditions and maximum thresholds), 
an offset from subsidiaries is often not allowed. In addition, diverging national loss-
compensation rules generate even in the case of branches interpretational divergences 
detrimental to their recognition by tax authorities.
56  
The calculation of transfer prices  
Transfer pricing is significant for tax authorities as it affects the tax allocation 
between different jurisdictions. Companies encounter several problems with the 
concept in practice. In 1995, the OECD developed guidelines for “Transfer Pricing” 
which proposed a standardised way for allocating tax revenues for companies 
operating across borders.
57 The proposed pricing methods are all based on the “arm’s 
length principle”, which treats transactions between a company group for tax purposes 
as if the transaction would have been conducted at market prices, and therefore 
comparable to conditions of transactions between independent parties. Member States 
have increased their auditing activities in order to avoid that companies use transfer 
pricing as a tax avoidance tool (shifting profits from high tax to low tax jurisdictions). 
This approach seems to entail high administrative costs deriving from complex 
national documentation requirements and companies face the risk of an eventual 
dispute with or between Member States’ tax authorities, which can involve lengthy 
and expensive procedures.  
In October 2002, the Commission established a Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
(involving representatives from tax authorities, industry and consultancy). The Forum 
works on the basis of consensus to examine possible non-legislative solutions to the 
practical problems related to the application of the transfer pricing rules in the Internal 
Market and to those related to the implementation of the Arbitration Convention.
58 
The objective is to make the EU Arbitration Convention the prevailing dispute 
settlement mechanism within the EU for the relief of double taxation resulting from 
differences in transfer pricing methods in Member States. To achieve this, the 
Arbitration Convention should provide for appropriate mechanisms to allow double 
taxation relief quickly and efficiently in as many cases as possible and with the lowest 
possible costs for business and tax administration. At present, this is far from being 
the case.  
Shortcomings in double taxation treaties 
Member States have concluded a number of agreements with the aim of avoiding 
double taxation of companies operating on a cross-border basis. However, this goal is 
not always achieved. Article 293 of the EU Treaty requires Member States to 
negotiate the abolition of double taxation within the EU. Consequently, a network of 
                                                 
56 For instance, since the determination of the taxable base and taxable income varies in every Member 
State, no common “loss” definition exists in the EU. Similar problems arise with the consolidation of 
profits and losses in the few countries which extend this possibility to potential cross-border losses. 
57 OECD (1995). 
58 Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits and 
associated enterprises (COM 90/436/EC).  
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bilateral double taxation treaties has emerged. However, due to the variety of 
applicable national tax systems, the complexity of double taxation situations as well 
as interpretational divergences, the treaties seem to fail in their quest to eliminate 
double taxation in all cases. For example, complex anti-abuse clauses and a number of 
exceptions on withholding tax exemptions and on offsetting foreign tax payments 
make it difficult for corporate groups to determine their treaty benefits. In addition, 
the very concept of “permanent establishment” – essential for double taxation treaties 
– has undergone a change in recent years in the face of technological progress 
(internet) and due to the evolution of corporate group structures.
59 
 
4.2.3. The absence of common financial reporting  
Although the EU has introduced a number of steps towards common reporting for 
banks,
60 different national accounting standards make the comparison of balance 
sheets difficult and may, therefore, constitute a barrier for potential bidders in the 
context of cross-border banking consolidation. For example, a recent report from 
Standard & Poors describes the difficulties in comparing the quality of credit 
decisions and the adequacy of provisioning between banks in Western Europe as 
being “exacerbated ...by the diverse regulations and management practices relating to 
asset quality accounting.” The report goes on to say that “there are major differences 
between the definitions of impaired, non-performing, and doubtful loans, and related 
to this, policies on interest accrual vary. There are also significant differences in 
provisioning and write-off policies applied in light of the prevailing regulation in the 
individual countries in Europe.”
 61  
A partial remedy to this situation might come through the application of the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). From 2005 onwards, all EU listed 
companies – including banks and other financial institutions - will be required to 
prepare their accounts in accordance with IAS, developed by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an independent privately-funded body. This will 
allow EU banks to base their financial reporting on harmonised rules, and depart 
therefore from their specific national reporting traditions. The IASB approach is based 
on the adoption of fair value accounting principles (FVA) instead of the hitherto 
practiced historical cost accounting (HCA). The FVA method values tradable assets 
and liabilities in the balance sheet at market (rather than historical) values, while 
resorting to a model-based valuation in the case of a non-tradable asset. Although the 
Commission has already endorsed most of IAS, it has so far refrained from doing the 
same for some portions of IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: recognition and 
                                                 
59 Bilateral treaties based on the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention seem often not to solve 
many of the identified instances of double taxation, such as those resulting from cross-border loss-
compensation or transfer pricing disputes. In addition, double taxation treaties with non-EU countries 
are highly divergent, which results in EU companies being able to avoid double taxation when being 
located in some Member States but not in others.  
60 See for example the Directives 86/635/EEC, 2001/65/EC and 2003/51/EC.  
61 See Standard & Poors (2003).   
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measurement) - which would apply FVA to most financial instruments as the ECB, 
national supervisors and many banks have expressed concerns.  
The major deviations from the standards as originally proposed by the IASB concern 
the liability element in the so-called “fair value option”. One rationale for this 
decision has been the reflection that a rating downgrade might lead to increased 
profits. On the other hand, the asset side of the fair value option has remained, 
enabling different companies to value one and the same asset not held for trading at 
fair value or at historic costs and thereby diluting somewhat the original aim of 
arriving at a transparent and harmonised financial reporting system. Another removed 
provision relates to hedge accounting, where a number of banks have expressed 
concerns that this provision would constitute an obstacle for allowing portfolio 
hedging of core deposits on a fair value measurement basis.   
 
4.3   Provision of cross-border banking services 
 
If banks were able to supply products and services on an EU-wide basis, the EU 
banking market could become integrated from the consumer side. However, apart 
from bank-to-bank transactions and services offered by investment banks, this avenue 
for integration has not been exploited significantly to date. The following section 
examines the barriers to the cross-border provision of banking products and services 
under two headings: (i) the absence of European private law and (ii) differences in 
national consumer protection laws.  
4.3.1   Lack of European private law 
 
Due to divergences in European contract law, firms active in the Single Market are 
required to use different standard contracts in each Member State, which in turn 
makes it impossible to use the same business model for the entire market. This creates 
legal uncertainty, while increasing the cost of cross-border transactions, and is likely 
to discourage firms from seeking to operate on pan-EU basis. Such impediments to 
cross-border provision of services derive essentially from mandatory rules applied in 
accordance with national legislation. Mandatory rules are found either in contract law 
itself or in a variety of other laws applying to international transactions (e.g. consumer 
law, bankruptcy law, securities law, corporate law).  
The importance of European private law to the functioning of a Single Market in 
banking services has been well established in the academic literature.
62 So far, the 
method for creating European private law in this field has been via Community 
legislation, with EU consumer protection a particular focus (see directives on doorstep 
selling, consumer credit, unfair terms in consumer contracts, etc.). However, the 
content of private law in EU directives is still very limited. As a result, cross-border 
transactions remain difficult when relating to credits and for operators in securities 
markets. Granting cross-border credit is often only possible if the corresponding 
collateral is enforceable. The analysis of the validity of the cross-border transfer of 
securities necessitates costly in-depth legal expertise, which may discourage such 
                                                 
62 Smits (1998) 
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transactions. It is also generally observed that operators in cross-border securities 
markets suffer a significant risk resulting from the divergence of legal rules on 
securities.
63 
4.3.2   Consumer protection  
A prominent manifestation of the absence of European private law is in the area of 
consumer protection. Diverging national consumer protection rules hamper the 
provision of pan-EU retail banking products and thus hinder the exploitation of 
potential economies of scale on a cross-border basis.
64 As EU legislation on retail 
consumer protection is limited in scope, Member States assemble their own consumer 
protection rules and require non-domestic financial providers to comply with them. In 
that context, Member States refer frequently to the “general good” concept.
65 
According to the rulings by the ECJ, the following are legitimate motives for invoking 
this concept.  
•  The need and extent of consumer protection-inspired exceptions depends on 
the relation between the risk level and the complexity of the financial service 
on the one hand, and the degree of vulnerability of the recipients of the service 
on the other. While professional clients (e.g. financial institutions, institutional 
investors, large enterprises) are able to assess risks associated with specific 
banking services properly, this may not be the case for individual consumers, 
which may constitute an acceptable ‘general good’ motive.
66  
•  The risks and complexity of some financial products may justify restrictive 
rules on advertising, selling methods and price transparency for financial 
services. The need is here to ensure fairness in commercial transactions.  
•  The significance of consumer confidence in the product quality and in the 
involved intermediaries allows for measures aiming at the protection of 
financial market integrity at the firm level.
67  
•  The ECJ has also acknowledged that the coherence of the fiscal system
68 is 
equally a ‘general good’ motive for justifying restrictions on cross-border 
financial services. Broadly, ECJ rulings in this area have fixed the limits of 
Member States’ competence in the field of direct taxation in the context of the 
free movement principles guaranteed by the EC Treaty. This refers to the 
                                                 
63 Some of the examples are also covered in a Commission Action plan in the area of contract law 
presented in 2003.  
64 Thus equally hampering the incentives for pursuing the other two banking integration venues.  
65 As provided for by Article 153(5) of the Treaty on ‘Consumer Protection’. 
66 See Case C-222/95 Parodi 
67 See Case C-204/90 Bachmann, Case C-80/94 Wielockx, Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson 
68 See Case C-250/95 Futura Participations and Singer 
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fundamental right of Member States (enshrined in Article 58 of the Treaty) to 
differentiate the treatment of taxpayers in accordance with their place of 
residence or the place where their money is invested. However, another 
provision of the same article provides that Member States may not 
differentiate to such an extent that the applied fiscal rules would actually 
constitute an arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on the free 
movement of capital (these provisions apply on capital movements and by 
extension on financial services as well). Obviously, there is a thin line between 
an acceptable differentiation and an unacceptable discriminatory treatment and 
it is the ECJ’s responsibility to weed out acceptable from unacceptable 
practice. “Coherence of the fiscal system” was acknowledged in the nineties as 
a possible justification, but the ECJ seemed to resort to a stricter interpretation 
in more recent years.
69  
•  Finally, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision may demand the enforcement of 
measures restricting cross-border trade in financial services. According to ECJ 
case law, Member States should, in the exercise of their fiscal competencies, 
comply with the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty, which implies the 
obligation to maintain only those fiscal supervision measures which, if they 
produce restrictive effects on free movement, are objectively necessary to 
ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision. However, the establishment of 
this principle by the ECJ does not imply that Member States may enjoy an 
unlimited freedom in that regard.  
 
The  diversity of these ‘general good’ inspired national consumer protection 
regulations reduces the capacity of banks to offer products and services on an EU-
wide basis.
70 Consequently, banks are unable to exploit economies of scale in offering 
pan-EU pension or mortgage products or economies of scope by offering products 
from their home Member State in addition to those available in the host Member 
State. The diversity and uneven level of consumer protection legislation – rather than 
consumer protection as such - acts therefore as a brake on cross-border banking 
consolidation. 
One way of remedying this situation could be financial service legislation at the EU 
level, which would replace the ‘general good’ exceptions at Member State level. 
Recently, there have been several forces working in this direction. For example, there 
is increasing interest in consumer protection on the part of the European Parliament. 
In addition, the European Commission has adopted a consumer policy strategy 
71 for 
the period 2002-2006. The rationale underlying this strategy is the need for common 
(or at least convergent) rules ensuring at the same time sufficient protection of 
consumer interests and the elimination of regulatory obstacles and competitive 
distortions in the Internal Market. One goal of this strategy is to implement a high 
                                                 
69 See also Case C-315/02 Lenz and Case C-319/02 Manninen 
70 See Heinemann and Jopp (2002).  
71 Commission from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, 
COM(2002) 208final. 
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common level of consumer protection across the EU, which covers all aspects of 
consumer economic interests, and gives consumers the necessary confidence to 
conduct transactions anywhere in the Internal Market. In particular, this principle 
applies on the retail market for financial services. While many actions have already 
been undertaken in the framework of the Financial Services Action Plan, 
complementary actions are provided by this strategy in order to increase confidence in 
cross-border transactions. Overall, Directives governing specific types of financial 
services are to be revised and updated while new directives should also be adopted. 
The list of planned actions covers, among others, a Directive on consumer credit
72, as 
well as Directives on market abuse, prospectus, investment services, and transparency 
obligations of quoted companies. 
 
In terms of market reaction to the proposals, public consultations showed that most 
voices supported a future harmonisation of consumer protection legislation and/or fair 
commercial practices based on “full harmonisation” which would help in creating a 
level playing field. However, some questioned the level of protection, which the 
Commission aims to establish.  
 
The Commission’s consumer policy strategy provides also for other actions targeting 
the general legislation on consumer economic interests (which, by definition, covers 
also the financial services sector). In particular, one aim is to further harmonise 
existing rules on commercial practices in accordance with the options set out in the 
Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection
73, which aims to progressively 
adapt the existing framework from minimum harmonisation to full harmonisation 
measures (so as to effectively address the main differences in national rules on 
commercial practices). In particular, these options include the update of directives on, 
respectively, misleading advertising, price indications, terms in consumer contracts, 
contracts negotiated away from business premises, distance selling contracts. 
Moreover, the Commission adopted in 2001 a Communication on European Contract 
Law
74, which launched a consultation process on potential problems for the internal 
market and the uniform application of Community law resulting from the divergence 
of national contract laws. Furthermore, the 2002-2006 strategy targets also the 
effective enforcement of consumer protection rules and the proper involvement of 






                                                 
72 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, as amended by 
Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February 1990; European Parliament and Council Directive 98/7/EC of 16 
February 1998. 
73 COM(2001) 531 final 
74 COM(2001) 398 final 
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5. The EU supervisory framework 
5.1. Current arrangements for EU cross-border supervision  
The EU supervisory framework is designed to facilitate integration of the banking 
system. Directive 89/646/EEC, the so-called “Second Banking Directive”, and similar 
legislative texts entered into force in 1993 and were consolidated in a single Directive 
in the year 2000 (2000/12/EC). This Directive provides one of the most important 
pillars for banking supervision in the Internal Market.
75 The Directive states that a 
credit institution (a bank for the purposes of this paper) is allowed to open branches in 
the other EU Member States, so long as it is authorised to do so by its home-country 
supervisor. In this way, a single banking licence opens the possibility for the bank to 
do business throughout the EU while the home-country supervisor retains 
responsibility for its financial health. The home-country supervisor has the power to 
scrutinise the adequacy of the institution’s administrative structure and financial 
situation and, if appropriate, to prohibit the bank from opening branch in another 
Member State. However, the justification for any negative decision must be disclosed, 
allowing the bank to contest the supervisor’s decision in court.  
Once the home-country supervisor has authorised the bank to open branches in 
another Member State, the host-country supervisor may not interfere except to require 
the foreign-owned branches to report periodically on their activities for statistical 
purposes. The host-country supervisor, however, retains responsibility for supervision 
of branch liquidity and may interrupt the provision of services by the branch if any 
legal provisions in this regard are being violated. Moreover, in emergency situations, 
the host-country supervisor may – subject to ex-post Commission control – take any 
precautionary measures necessary to protect the interests of depositors, investors and 
others to whom services are provided. Given this division of responsibility between 
home and host-country supervisors, close co-operation is required between the two 
agents. A number of Memoranda of Understanding have been signed to that effect, 
although none of these is legally binding.  
A second possibility for a bank to expand across borders within the EU is via the 
establishment of a subsidiary in another Member State. As indicated in Section 4.1, 
this possibility is broadly as popular as expansion via branches. In this case, the 
foreign-owned subsidiary must report primarily to the host-country supervisor, 
although the home-country supervisor remains responsible for supervising the 
subsidiary and its parent bank on a consolidated basis.   
 
5.2. Problems relating to the use of cross-border branches and 
subsidiaries 
The subsidiary structure has been regarded until recently as a convenient means to 
facilitate market entry without the need for a major change in Member State 
arrangements. However, a bank operating across borders via subsidiaries is subject to 
host-country supervision in each and every Member State - in addition to home-
                                                 
75 Other Directives would include, for example, the Directive on Financial Conglomerates and on E-
Money Institutions. 
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country supervision on a consolidated basis. A pan-EU bank can therefore be required 
to deal with a plethora of supervisors from different jurisdictions, each operating in 
accordance with different rules and distinct procedures. Consequently, supervisory 
compliance costs - such as different prudential reporting requirements and formats, in 
particular - can act as a significant barrier to cross-border banking activities conducted 
via subsidiaries and can interfere with efforts by banks to achieve the most efficient 
functional organisation on a pan-EU basis. Not unexpectedly, such compliance costs 
have emerged as a major issue in the debate on further integration of the EU banking 
sector.  
In the case of a bank expansion via branches, the home-country supervisor bears the 
main cost in supervising the foreign-branch activities of its domestic banks, while the 
host country receives most of the possible benefits (and risk) in terms of a healthy (or 
frail) domestic financial system. Consequently, the home-country supervisor may face 
sub-optimal incentives in performing its duties vis-à-vis the host country. This 
problem of incentives would be most pronounced in circumstances where the foreign-
branch business of the home-country bank is relatively small in terms of its total 
activity but relatively large in terms of the host country’s banking system. In such a 
situation, financial distress in the bank’s foreign branches would have only limited 
consequences for the home country but would have more significant implications for 
the financial system of the host county (Schüler 2003).
76  
Another issue might arise if a bank’s overall balance sheet is healthy enough to permit 
further lending, domestically as well as abroad, while considerations related to the 
business-cycle or the exchange rate would warrant tightening lending conditions in a 
host country. As a result, a special type of conflict could arise between home country 
prudential control related to specific banks solvency ratios and host country concerns 
relating to overall financial stability.  
Therefore the responsibilities of a home-country supervisor in relation to foreign 
branches can be a cause of concern for the host-country supervisor. While the host 
country retains some emergency powers, these can be used only in extremis, if a spirit 
of co-operation and trust between home and host supervisor – as well as the 
confidence of foreign banks operating in the host country – is to be maintained.
77 In 
these circumstances, the host-country supervisor has very limited possibilities to 
influence the behaviour of foreign banks within its domestic financial system. 
Moreover, banks operating through branches across borders link financial stability in 
various Member States, heightening the contagion risk. Adding to the potential 
concerns for host country authorities – including the host central banks - would be the 
possibility for foreign banks to circumvent domestic monetary policy objectives in 
smaller Member States.  
                                                 
76 See also Group of Ten (2001) Chapter III, pp. 152f. 
77 A further complication in the use of those “emergency” instruments would be that banking crisis are 
often characterised by being both (i) developing and spreading rapidly, making swift supervisory action 
necessary as well as (ii) opaque and not transparent (even for supervisors). However, quick unilateral 
pre-emptive actions within an obscure environment might not necessarily allow the host supervisors to 
clearly demonstrate the actions’ justification in an ex-post context; 
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More specific problems can arise for the host-country supervisor in the operational 
phase of a cross-border banking M&A, when operational risk and managerial risk can 
be high. Unintended credit and liquidity risks can arise due to a technical failure, 
especially in an early transition phase where management might not yet be in full 
control of a newly-created entity. Risks stemming from operational failures might be 
relevant in the consolidation of back office operations. Organisational problems in the 
context of complex mergers and acquisitions can be another hazard, particularly if the 
management lack experience in some activities of the new entity.  
In case of a crisis, the situation would be even more complex as not only the 
supervisors, but also the central banks and the Ministries of Finance may be involved 
raising co-ordination issues on the national level as well as cross-border. On the 
national level, different institutions might be required to co-ordinate and co-operate 
their actions in a straightforward and rapid way. However, it can be expected that 
national arrangements are sufficiently well developed to be able to cope with eventual 
crisis. Therefore co-ordination on the national level would seem relatively easy when 
compared to cross-border co-ordination between home and host country authorities or 
between different host country authorities in the case of a subsidiary. Although it can 
be expected that supervisory authorities would in general share the common goal of 
redressing a crisis situation effectively, there might be some delicate cases:  
•  In case a domestic bank has expanded via branches, the home country 
authorities would be fully responsible for addressing that bank’s eventual 
distress. In a case where the bank’s foreign-branch business is large relative to 
total business, there is a risk that national interests might discourage the home-
country supervisor from declaring a bank insolvent as this would put pressure 
on the home-country tax payers to provide funds for bail-out payments or 
restructuring costs, while only benefiting the home country in small part. Such 
logic could encourage cautious home-country authorities to curtail the bank’s 
expansion into other Member States. In case of a pan-European bank, 
procedures to agree on eventual bank bankruptcy proceedings and/or 
agreements for eventual banking bailouts might becomes necessary in order to 
avoid an undue burden on a (possibly small) home country.  
•  In case of financial difficulties for a large pan-European bank – operating 
through subsidiaries – a large number of authorities might have to co-ordinate 
their actions effectively to find quickly an overall response. Here, 
philosophical and political differences influence national actions in addressing 
a bank crisis potentially leading to conflicts in case some authorities would 
favour a bail out of the whole group, while others would be inclined to let the 
bank subsidiary in their jurisdiction fail.   
•  Emergency liquidity assistance through a domestic central bank would be 
another issue, possible involving similar problems. The supranational 
character of the monetary authority responsible for the euro might raise the 
additional matter of how diverging views between participating central banks 
might be resolved.   
While the highlighted issues are of general relevance in the context of EU financial 
integration, they might be of special significance in the context of the recently 
acceded Member States and their largely foreign owned banking system, where EU 
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entry might (i) foster additional foreign bank entry due to the single licence, and (ii) 
open the possibility of a conversion of bank subsidiaries into branches or (iii) the use 
of the institutional form of the European Company Statute.
78 
5.3. Proposals to improve EU supervisory arrangements 
EU supervisory co-operation arrangements addressing home and host country 
arrangements exist, involving information sharing and co-ordination elements. This 
has been enhanced following the Brouwer report and the Lamfalussy report as the 
Commission has proposed to extend the four-level approach hitherto used in the 
securities sector to the banking sector as well.
79 The measures will allow for a much 
deeper level of co-operation and a much more harmonised approach to day-to-day 
supervision and regulation but also contribute to crisis management capabilities.  
Further banking integration might fuel a possible reform of the EU supervisory 
framework, possibly propelled by the EU entry of the 10 new Member States, where 
some banking systems are largely foreign owned. The matter is gaining increased 
attention from competent political bodies, allowing further progress to be made. It is 
noteworthy in this context that a number of proposals are discussed for developing the 
EU supervisory structure further. For example there are calls for a lead-supervisor to 
deal with the split of work between home and host country supervisors, although the 
exact role and competences are not yet very well defined. In addition, such a model 
would have to overcome the diverging incentive structures of home and host 
authorities. A variation would be the delegation of certain powers currently held by a 
home supervisor to a host supervisor or – in the case of a pan-European operating 
bank – to delegate supervisory powers to a selected supervisor, or a supervisory 
network. A second possible modification in current supervisory arrangements would 
be a single supervisory authority, constituted either as a centralised institution or 
organised in a more de-centralised way. A variation would be a single supervisory 
authority exclusively devoted to banks operating on a cross-border basis. This ground-
breaking idea would seem to be difficult to implement in the current environment.  
While the advantages of such a model would be that a unified structure could 
presumably better overcome the mentioned diverging incentive structures, effective 
prudential supervision would still be hampered by the unsolved topics of cross-border 
(i) liquidity assistance and (ii) eventual tax-payer financed bail-outs.
80 As a result, it 
might be advisable to address those crucial matters first before initiating a full-fledged 
change of the EU supervisory framework.  
                                                 
78 These possibilities are also mentioned in European Central Bank (2005) 
79 Brouwer Report (2000); The four level framework (also in the process of covering banking 
legislation) foresees on level 1 a framework text agreed to by the Council and Parliament, to be filled 
later with more detailed provisions by the Commission in level 2, after a vote by the European 
Securities Committee and following advice of the European Securities Regulators Committee. The later 
committee works in level 3 together on joint interpretations, guidelines and common standards, peer 
review and compares regulatory practice to ensure consistent implementation and application. In the 
level 4, the Commission checks Member States compliance with EU legislation and may take legal 
action if a breach of Community law is suspected. See Lamfalussy (2001).  
80 More detailed cross-border issues to be addressed in that context would include the provision of bank 
liquidity provision, emergency liquidity assistance, crisis management, lender of last resort 
clarification, deposit guarantee schemes as well as bank liquidation. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
The repeatedly high hopes for a pick-up in EU cross-border banking integration 
activity - such as at the time of the creation of a single market or the introduction of 
the euro – have not materialised and progress in that area is lagging behind domestic 
consolidation. The objective of this paper has been to review obstacles for cross-
border EU banking integration from a broader economic perspective, supplemented 
by an analysis of remaining barriers. In doing so, the paper has provided a fairly 
comprehensive list of existing obstacles and their impact on the main avenues for 
cross-border banking integration. In addition, the role of institutional factors relating 
to the framework for prudential supervision has been considered, notably in the 
context of the relationship of home and host country supervisors with each other and 
with market participants.  
A number of conclusions can be drawn: 
•  Due to a number of obstacles – some of which possibly erected with the 
specific purpose of preventing cross-border integration - EU banking systems 
are mostly segmented along national borders, at least for smaller customers, 
both at the corporate and the consumer level. The implication is a loss of 
welfare related to reduced efficiency, competition and consumer choice.  
•  Concerning avenues for EU banking integration, the single license – although 
a laudable step at the time of its introduction - is not a panacea for the future of 
EU banking integration within the current supervisory and legal framework. In 
addition, banks would be expected to hesitate in establishing greenfield 
operations in other Member States and may prefer to enter a foreign banking 
market through mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  
•  Possibilities for banking M&As on a cross border basis need to be facilitated 
through an appropriate legal framework targeting national investment 
restrictions. While the European Company Statute is a step forward by 
allowing large corporate groups to complete cross-border M&As, the recently 
approved takeover Directive opens the possibilities for defensive measures 
adopted by target companies. Many cross-border barriers still derive from tax 
legislation, such as – among others - the double taxation applying to income 
flows between associated companies established in different countries or a 
restriction of loss-offsets incurred by foreign subsidiaries. In addition, an 
international framework of rules and regulations on financial reporting is 
necessary, not least to ensure that the disclosed information by banks is 
comparable across the EU.  
•  Another area needing attention is the removal of barriers for the provision of 
cross-border banking services. The absence of a sufficiently consolidated 
European private law creates difficulties for enforcing cross-border collateral 
pledges. A prominent manifestation of this more general problem are the 
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diverging levels of consumer protection, making the introduction of EU wide 
retail banking products (mortgages, loans, pension products, saving vehicles) 
impossible, thus denying banks - operating on a cross-border basis - the 
possibility to reap economics of scale. A harmonisation of consumer 
protection rules or mutual recognition of consumer protection provisions for 
retail banking products might constitute alternative proposals for overcoming 
this barrier.  
•  The EU supervisory framework is designed to facilitate integration of the 
banking system. However, a bank operating across borders via subsidiaries is 
subject to host-country supervision in each and every Member State - in 
addition to home-country supervision on a consolidated basis. A pan-EU bank 
can therefore be required to deal with a plethora of supervisors from different 
jurisdictions, each operating in accordance with different rules and distinct 
procedures. In the case of a bank expansion via branches, the home-country 
supervisor bears the main cost in supervising the foreign-branch activities of 
its domestic banks, while the host country receives most of the benefits in 
terms of a healthy domestic financial system. Consequently, the home-country 
supervisor may face sub-optimal incentives in performing its duties vis-à-vis 
the host country. In case of a crisis, the situation would be even become more 
complex as not only the supervisors, but also the central banks and the 
Ministries of Finance may be involved. Therefore, the current structure would 
seem only adequate in case of limited financial integration and might require 
new thinking in a more integrated environment. This issue, which is already 
relevant in an EU composed of 15 Members, might become even more topical 
in an EU with 25 Members, where some of the new Member States’ banking 
systems are largely foreign owned.  
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